Catholic University Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 7

1958

Recent Cases
Jay N. Price
John Burns Hausner
Richard J. St. John

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Jay N. Price, John B. Hausner & Richard J. St. John, Recent Cases, 7 Cath. U. L. Rev. 56 (1958).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol7/iss1/7

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VII

affiliation, the most important of which were: the element of dependability, a
furtherance of the objectives of the proscribed organization, a continuing course
of conduct which could not be abruptly ended including reciprocal responsibilities
and duties. The Bridges test must be applied to all instructions regarding affiliation
with the Communist Party.
With reluctance, it must be admitted that the majority opinion in the Jencks
case has overlooked this important issue. It is with great relief, however, that
we are able to recognize that there is such an important problem through the
insight of four members of the same court.
JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.

RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT-PUPIL

ASSIGNMENT

LAWS-The school law of Virginia provides for a Pupil Placement Board charged
with the duty of assigning students to schools. In making such assignments, the
Board was to consider "the effect of the enrollment on the welfare and best interests
of the child and all other children in said school as well as the effect on the
efficiency of the operation of said school; the sociological, psychological and like
intangible social scientific factors as will prevent, as nearly as possible, a condition
of socio-economic class consciousness among the pupils; and such other relevant
matters as may be pertinent to the efficient operation of the schools or indicate a
clear and present danger to the public peace and tranquility affecting the safety or
welfare of the citizens of such school district." The present action was brought
by Negro school children and their parents to require the defendants to cease
and desist from any practices, customs, or usages in segregating school students.
The United States District Court declared the above law to be unconstitutional
after considering the obvious intent of the Virginia legislature to maintain
segregation. Adkins v. School Board of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.
Va. 1957"), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1957).
The Virginia Pupil Placement law is but one of many similar statutes passed
by various southern states in an effort to continue unchanged the former patterns
of public school attendance, the total segregation of white and Negro. Thus, as
an exercise of the state's police power, these laws are enacted to provide for the
public welfare by promoting the health, safety, order and efficient education of
the people. ALA. LAWS REG. SESS. c. 31380 (1956) (preamble), FLA. LAWS
EXTRAORDINARY SESS. c. 31380 (1956) (preamble). Prior to 1954, there was
no need for such assignment laws. Under the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, the
states were able to continue the practice of segregation so long as equal facilities
were provided for all races. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In 1954,
however, the controversial doctrine of "separate but equal" facilities was discarded by the Supreme Court, and segregation in the public schools by virtue of
race was held to be unconstitutional. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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The Brown case presented a formidable obstacle to the continuation of segregation. The Virginia law sought to circumvent the decision of the Supreme Court
by retaining as far as possible the status quo and by permitting a change only
after a petitioner had gone through a long series of state administrative and
judicial proceedings. CODE OF VA. § 22-232.7-16 (1956). Relying on the well
settled proposition that before coming into a federal court, a plaintiff must have
exhausted all available state administrative remedies [Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937)], the Virginia law forced a petitioner through a
series of proceedings during which 105 days might elapse between the filing of
the petition and the final decision.
This provision of the Virginia law was also unavailing. Although an administrative remedy is available, it must also be adequate. Carson v. Warlick,
238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956). In this respect, the Virginia law put a prospective
petitioner into an almost futile position. Not only did the individual face a possible adverse decision, but there was also the risk of forfeiting a full year of
schooling or advancing to another grade and possibly having to bring a new and
later action. Added to these difficulties was the further provision that where
any system of public schools was not deemed to be "efficient" the funds appropriated for the maintenance of such schools would be withheld. To qualify
this, the Virginia Assembly stated: "An efficient system of elementary public
schools means and shall be only that system within each county, city or town
in which no elementary school consists of a student body in which white and
colored children are taught." See Adkins v. School Board of Newport News, 148
F. Supp. 430, 437 (1957). Thus, where a possible remedy was available under
the administrative procedure, it was subsequently destroyed by the threatened
closure of any school which would comply with an order to integrate. This
administrative remedy, as pointed out by the court in the Adkins decision, led
to a complete "blind alley".
Although there have been many attempts by states through legislation to
perpetuate the segregated school systems now in existence, the courts are slowly
cutting away at the validity of these statutes. See Orleans Parish School.Board v.
Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46,
238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956). It is debatable whether the Supreme Court could
foresee the repercussions of the Brown decision in 1954. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). At that time, there seemed to be no question as to
the meaning of the principles set forth. Yet, from this decision has come a
succession of attempts by various states through legislation to change those
principles. The theory that a state constitution stands above the rights granted
by the federal constitution should have disappeared with the confederacy.
The Brown decision is a reality and must be faced as such. The resulting
responsibilities imposed on the states are great and to effect the integration
called for will no doubt give rise to many unexpected hardships in the south.
The recent events in Little Rock, Arkansas, point this out only too well. It is
conceivable that Pupil Assignment Laws will be adopted which can pass the
test of constitutionality, and that the states may thus avert integration. But, in
the last analysis, the rights granted individuals under the United States Constitution
must prevail.
JAY N. PRICE
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TEST INADMISSIBLE-In a recent case, the defendant was convicted of operating

a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The state was permitted to show that the accused had refused to take a sobriety test. The Criminal
Court of Appeals in reversing, held that the defendant had the right to refuse
such a test and that this right would be rendered ineffective should the state be
allowed to bring that fact to the jury. Duckworth v. State, 309 P. 2d 1103 (Okla.
1957).
The provisions of the relevant Oklahoma statute state: "No person shall
be compelled to give evidence which will tend to incriminate him," with an added
provision that, ".

.

. the person charged shall at his own request, but not other-

wise, be a competent witness and his failure to make such request shall not create
any presumption against him nor be mentioned in the trial." 22 OKLA. STAT. §
701 (1951). See Shepard v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 131, 139 P. 2d 605 (1943),
Bell v. State, 55 Okla. Crim. 439, 32 P. 2d 747 (1934), Shelton v. State, 49 Okla.
Crim. 430, 295 P. 2d 240 (1931), Zedda v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. 348, 235 Pac.
939 (1925). Some states cover the matter by constitutional provision. The Ohio
Constitution, for instance, provides, "No person shall be compelled in a criminal
prosecution to be a witness against himself, but his failure to testify may be considered by the court and the jury and may be subject of comment by counsel.
OHIO CONST. Art. I § 10 (1912). Other states do not have the matter covered
by either constitutional provision or by statute. See State v. Benson, 230 Iowa
1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1941). Professor Wigmore notes that the privilege against
self incrimination was established in the common law to protect the individual
against "the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips
an admission of guilt." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (3d. ed. 1940). This rule
would hold admissible all manners of real or physical evidence obtained from a
forced observation. Indeed, a constitutional provision against self incrimination
has been held not to afford protection against compulsory examination in the
following cases: taking fingerprints under compulsion [United States v. Kelly, 55
F. 2d 67 (2 Cir. 1923), McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 548, 45 At. 2d
842 (1946), Shannon v. State, 207 Ark. 658, 182 S.W. 2d 384 (1944), Owensby
v. Morris,-Tex. Civ. App.-, 79 S.W. 2d 934 (1935), People v. Jones, 112 Cal.
App. 68, 296 Pac. 317 (1931), McGarry v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 597, 200 S.W.
527 (1918), People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447, 165 N.Y. Supp. 915 (1917); measuring of shoes and feet [State v. Smith, 133 S.C. 291, 130 S.E. 884 (1925)];
examining the defendant for identifying scars, marks or wounds [State v. Oschoa,
49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926), State v. Ab Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep.
530 (1879)]; compelling the defendant to speak for voice identification [Commonwealth v. Valeroso, 273 Pa. 213, 116 At. 828 (1922), Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 9 At. 78 (1886)]; forcing the defendant to display clothes
[Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242
Pac. 582 (1926)]; forcing him to dye his hair [Smith v. United States, 187 F.
2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951)]; compelling the
defendant to stand during the trial for better identification [State v. Vincent, 222
N.C. 543, 23 S.E. 2d 832 (1943), People v. Clark, 18 Cal. 2d 449 (1941),
Rutherford v. State, 135 Tex Crim. 530, 121 S.W. 2d 342 (1938)]; compelling
a person to unwrap a bandaged hand alleged to be burned. State v. Garrett, 71
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N.C. 85 (1874). As was so well stated by Justice Holmes when a prisoner was
obliged to don a shirt for identification purposes: ".

.

. the prohibition of com-

pelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him,
not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245, 252, 253 (1910).
There must, of course, be a limitation to the amount of force employed in
obtaining evidence. Where the zeal of the police is shocking to the conscience of
the Court, there is a violation of due process. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952). On the other hand, manual and breath tests are quite generally approved
as long as the process is not so abusive as to be a denial of due process. Indeed,
such a situation occurred in the Alexander case, wherein the accused was arrested, taken to the station, and charged with drunken driving. There she was
refused permission to use a telephone to summon counsel and was not advised
of her constitutional right to refuse to submit to the drunkometer tests. In affirming
the conviction the Criminal Court of Appeals held that the privilege against
self incrimination was not violated by these tests-walking a straight line,
picking up coins, and blowing up a balloon-even though these tests were not
freely entered into but were performed by reason of fear. No force or brutality
was employed to bring the case under the Rochin doctrine, though the manual
demonstrations were in effect compulsory. Alexander v. State, 305 P. 2d 572
(Okla. 1956). Apparently there is no problem when the accused is unconscious.
The Supreme Court held that a conviction based on the result of an involuntary
blood test taken while the defendant was unconscious did not deprive him of
his liberty so as to violate due process. Briethoupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
See also State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945). In both cases it may
be assumed that the tests were performed without the consent and very possibly
against the will of the accused.
In the present case, Duckworth was not timid and not unconscious. Police
officers described his actions at the station as "uncooperative and cocky". He
simply refused to perform any of the tests offered for determining intoxication.
It appears to be an erroneous policy to make an accused's enjoyment of his constitutional rights contingent upon his ability to resist the police in their efforts
to obtain evidence as these cases seem to intimate.
JOHN BURNS HAUSNER
TORTS-HUSBAND AND WIFE-HUSBAND ALLOWED TO SUE WIFE FOR DAMAGES IN NEGLIGENCE SUIT-In a personal injury action in Arkansas, a husband

sued his wife for damages suffered as a consequence of her negligent operation of
an automobile. Her vehicle collided with a pick-up truck driven by the plaintiff
as she was proceeding at an excessive rate of speed on the wrong side of the
road. In defense, it was pleaded that the Married Woman's Statute of Arkansas
allowed personal injury suits between spouses only when brought by the wife.
It was held in the instant case that to apply a different rule depending upon
which spouse is the plaintiff would be inconsistent. The husband was intended by
the legislature to enjoy the same right to sue as his wife. Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.
2d 15 (Ark. 1957).
The present case followed earlier Arkansas opinions dating back to 1916,
when a wife was first allowed to sue her husband for damages resulting from
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personal injuries. Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916), 187
S.W. 460 (1916) (dissent). However, it marks a distinct departure in American
law, since it is the first decision in favor of a husband in a personal injury action
against his wife. In the fifteen states which have allowed tort actions between
married parties, only two cases have been reported concerning actions instituted
by the husband. The decision and result of these two cases is strikingly similar.
In Wisconsin, a husband attempted to bring suit for damages arising from
negligent driving by his wife. Fehr v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W. 2d 787 (1944). It was held that the insurance
company was not liable under an indemnity contract, since the husband had no
right to sue his wife. The opinion stated that the Married Woman's Statute was
passed to enlarge the rights of married women and did not confer any rights not
specifically provided. WIs. STAT. § 246.07 (1957).
In May, 1947, the Wisconsin legislature expressly provided for such a case
by allowing a husband to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by him,
due to his wife's "wrongful act, neglect or default". WIs. STAT. § 246.075 (1957).
Another automobile case was decided adversely to the husband in a suit
instituted in North Carolina. Scholtman v. Scholtman, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E. 2d
350 (1949). The right to sue his wife was denied the husband, despite the fact
that North Carolina was the first state to allow a wife to sue her husband in. an
automobile negligence suit. Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923).
In 1951, the present North Carolina statute was enacted which provides:
"A husband and wife have a cause of action against each other to recover damages
sustained to their person or property as if unmarried. N.C. GEN STAT § 52-10.1
(Supp. 1953).
A similar provision exists inthe state of New York, which now provides that
a married woman is liable to her husband for her torts resulting in personal injury to her husband or to his property. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 57 (Supp. 1957).
Unique protection of insurance companies is afforded by a provision that no
recovery may be allowed against an insurance company in a suit between spouses
unless such liability is expressly contained in the insurance contract. N.Y. INS,
LAW § 167(3) (Supp. 1957).
Although few cases have arisen on this precise issue, legal commentators
strongly oppose discrimination between the sexes in tort actions between spouses.
See PROSSER ON TORTS § 101 (2d ed. 1955). The fictions of a husband-wife unit
and of universal domestic tranquility have been blotted out by modern experience.
The rationale behind a rule which denies a husband legal remedies against his
wife for damages arising from negligence, while allowing such remedies if sought
by any other party, is at best questionable. The modern public policy with respect
to personal injury cases seems to demand redress for such injuries. It is suggested
that the issues of fraud and collusion against insurance companies can be adequately settled before a jury, as in any other negligence suit. It is hoped that the
remaining forty-four states will follow the lead of these pioneers in abolishing
one more antique rule of common law.
RICHARD J. ST. JOHN

